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The “Deeming Rule”
THE FDA’S DESTRUCTION OF THE VAPING
INDUSTRY
“I currently work alone to build [devices that power atomizers in
e-cigarettes] for my local community. It took me years to find a hobby
that I excelled at and thoroughly enjoy. Business has been steadily
increasing and [I] have plans to expand and hire employees. But at
the proposed fees, I would have no choice but to stop.”1
INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the oldest
consumer protection agency in the United States, officially
created in 1930.2 The agency is tasked with the responsibility of
“protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy and
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products,
medical devices . . . our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and
products that emit radiation.”3 It has regulated the tobacco
industry since researchers discovered that cigarettes were
detrimental to human health.4 According to the FDA, tobacco
use kills more than 480,000 people in the United States each
year, and each day about 600 youth become daily smokers.5
About 42.1 million Americans smoke cigarettes.6
The FDA’s new “Deeming Rule,” an amendment to
President Barack Obama’s 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and
1 Brief of Amicus Curiae Smoke-Free Alternatives Trade Association in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment at 7, Nicopure Labs, LLC v. Food
and Drug Administration, 266 F. Supp. 3d 360 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-0878), 2016 WL
6355070 (survey response from an artisan in the business of crafting hand-engraved box
mod units for vaping use).
2 U.S. Food & Drug Administration: History, U.S. FOOD&DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm [https://perma.cc/34LZ-AVCE].
3 U.S. Food & Drug Administration: What We Do, U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ [https://perma.cc/CH9C-4LL3].
4 Kristi Keck, Big Tobacco: A History of its Decline, CNN (June 19, 2009) http://
edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/19/tobacco.decline/ [https://perma.cc/YP2T-U6GT].
5 Overview of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/ucm246129.htm [https://perma.cc/9Z46-A7VD].
6 Id.
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Tobacco Control Act (the Tobacco Control Act),7 expands the FDA’s
authority from only regulating traditional tobacco cigarettes based
on their negative health effects, to now regulating all other
categories of “tobacco products,” like e-cigarettes and vaporizers.8
The Deeming Rule, a series of regulations, states that once the
FDA has deemed a product to be a tobacco product, it can be
subsequently restricted in sale, distribution, and advertising by the
FDA. The purpose of the Deeming Rule is
(1) [t]o deem all products that meet the definition of ‘tobacco product’
under the law . . . and subject them to the tobacco control authorities
in chapter IX of the FD&C Act and FDA’s implementing regulations;
and (2) to establish specific restrictions that are appropriate for the
protection of the public health for the newly deemed tobacco products.9
Specifically, the regulation deems e-cigarettes and similar
products to be tobacco products, subjecting them to the same
intense regulatory treatment as traditional cigarettes.10
The FDA has concluded that these other tobacco products
pose health risks to society, so must be subject to rigorous
approval processes and heavily regulated by the government
before such products are allowed to be sold in the marketplace.
In effect, this regulation’s approval processes place burdensome
monetary and time barriers on e-cigarette companies,
threatening their demise by forcing them to comply. The FDA
derives its authority to pass this new regulation from the
Tobacco Control Act.11 As of August 8, 2016, the Tobacco Control
7 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111–31, § 3(8), 123 Stat. 1776, 1783 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2012)).
8 Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;
Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning
Statements for Tobacco Products; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975 (May 10, 2016) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, 1143) [hereinafter Deeming Rule]. A typical e-
cigarette looks almost identical to a traditional cigarette in terms of size, shape, and weight,
and delivers “flavored smoke-like vapor.”Differences Between E-Cigarettes and Vaporizers,
https://www.vaporfi.com/learn/e-cigarettes-vs-vaporizers.html [https://perma.cc/T46W-
KKN9]. They contain a “battery, the cartomizer (a combination of the cartridge and the
atomizer) and a silicone mouthpiece. An LED light on the end of the battery glows when
the user inhales, resembling the burning tip of a cigarette. The cartridge within the
cartomizer holds the e-liquid and is usually disposable once empty.” Id. On the other
hand, vaporizers are both more advanced and customizable by consumers. The device
has a “large battery on one end, a clear reservoir tank in the middle and a mouthpiece.
By pressing a small button on the side of the battery, the user engages the heating
element which vaporizes the e-juice and releases tasty vapor.” Id. A vaporizer is larger
than an e-cigarette, less traditional looking, delivers nicotine more smoothly and is
consistently refillable, whereas e-cigarettes are mostly disposable and provide more
limited flavor experimentation. Id.
9 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975.
10 Id.
11 Overview of the Family SmokingPrevention andTobacco Control Act, supranote 5.
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Act has granted the FDA broad authority to regulate the tobacco
market, including e-cigarettes and vaporizers.12 The Tobacco
Control Act allows the FDA to impose strict standards and
require companies to pay high fees with mandatory product
applications for market entry.13 Since the act’s May 2016
announcement, numerous e-cigarette and vaporizer companies
have filed lawsuits against the FDA, claiming this broad grant
of authority is unconstitutional.14 The high fees and burdensome
regulatory scheme threaten to put small, previously booming
businesses and vapor shops out of business for good.15
While nicotine-tobacco products have been heavily
regulated since Obama’s 2009 legislation, this abrupt addition
to the law to include some tobacco-free products is an
unauthorized extension of congressional authority.16 The FDA,
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), unjustifiably
concludes that vaping devices, including components of the
devices, are “tobacco products”17 under the Deeming Rule,18 a
ruling that is both “arbitrary [and] capricious,” and “unsupported
by substantial evidence.”19 The Deeming Rule specifically violates
the APA because the FDA failed to perform the thorough cost-
benefit analysis that the APA requires, and instead passed
arbitrary, burdensome legislation without considering alternative
avenues of regulation.20 The FDA neglected to consider less
burdensome alternatives that would be more fair to tobacco
12 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975.
13 Id.
14 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, LAWSUITS CHALLENGING THE FDA’S
DEEMING RULE (2016), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/FDA-
Tobacco-Deeming-Lawsuits-as-of-June-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3PS-ZWJP].
15 See id.
16 Complaint at 10,Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266F. Supp. 3d. 360 (D.D.C. 2017)
(No. 16-00878) 2016WL 2730789 [hereinafter Nicopure Labs Complaint]. The Deeming Rule
regulates tobacco products as well as tobacco-free products, which include individual
component parts that eventually assemble to create e-cigarettes and vaporizers.
17 See 21 U.S.C. § 387j (2012).
18 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 29015.
19 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), (2)(e) (2012). Under this section, courts must
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . [or] (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to [5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute.
Id. While the duty to perform a cost-benefit analysis is not written into the text of the
APA, courts have interpreted this section to recognize the need for cost-benefit analysis
“as an appropriate and possibly even necessary part of the regulatory process.” Eric
Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2001).
20 21 U.S.C. § 387j.
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companies, while still prioritizing the health of Americans, making
the Deeming Rule an unauthorized congressional action.
Part I of this note provides a brief history of tobacco
regulation and the Tobacco Control Act. This Part also explains the
lack of conclusive scientific evidence of e-cigarettes’ harmful effects,
especially relative to traditional cigarettes. Part II describes the
Deeming Rule and its burdensome registration requirements,
highlighting recent litigation. Part III recounts the purpose of the
APA and analyzes the act in light of the new FDA regulations on
e-cigarettes. Specifically, this Part argues that the Deeming Rule
is a clear violation of the APA because the rule is arbitrary and
lacks substantial evidence to support its passage, as legislators
failed to adequately perform a cost-benefit analysis when they
created the guidelines that lack merit. Finally, Part IV proposes
alternative solutions to the over-inclusive law that would comply
with the APA by adequately accounting for both costs and benefits.
E-cigarettes and other electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS)
products should be treated as consumer products instead of tobacco
products. The FDA must either weaken or eliminate the stringent
premarket authorization requirements and change the date by
which new companies would have to file in order to avoid the
burdensome regulations.
I. TOBACCO REGULATION
A. History
Startling public health research prompted Congress to
regulate the tobacco market to keep consumers completely
informed and knowledgeable about the health risks of tobacco
product use. According to the FDA, “[t]obacco use is the single
largest preventable cause of disease and death in the United
States.”21 In 1965, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act sought to increase consumer knowledge of nicotine-related
health risks by requiring a warning label on cigarette packaging
reading: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health.”22 While this legislation required labels and Federal Trade
Commission reports to Congress on the effectiveness of this
21 FDA’s New Regulations for E-Cigarettes, Cigars, and All Other Tobacco
Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Rules
RegulationsGuidance/ucm394909.htm [https://perma.cc/9BTG-HLZT].
22 SelectedActionsof theU.S.GovernmentRegarding theRegulationofTobaccoSales,
Marketing, and Use, Legislation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/by_topic/policy/legislation/ [https://perma.cc/FPC7-J6KT].
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labeling, it fell short in regulating all types of cigarette advertising,
especially targeted to the youth population.
In the 1990s, private litigation changed the landscape
of tobacco regulation. The Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA) resulted from a private tort liability suit and became
the “largest civil litigation settlement in U.S. history.”23 In
1994, four different states came together to sue large tobacco
companies, demanding compensation for Medicaid and other
medical costs for smoking-related diseases and damage.24 The
cigarette manufacturers defended themselves in the
litigation, claiming contributory negligence25 and asserting
that smokers were responsible for their own health and well-
being.26 Four years, later in 1998, the four largest cigarette
companies at the time—Philip Morris USA, R. J. Reynolds,
Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard—entered into a
settlement agreement with forty-six states, called the Master
Settlement Agreement.27 In exchange for Medicaid lawsuit
settlements and a release of private tort liability, cigarette
manufacturers agreed to pay about $10 billion annually to the
states in perpetuity, and agreed to strict restrictions on the
sale and marketing of cigarettes.28
In the years following the MSA, to fill a variety of
legislative gaps, Congress passed and President Obama signed
into law the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act (the Tobacco Control Act).29 This legislation went
beyond simple labeling requirements and disclosure by
ensuring that certain tobacco products complied with federal
23 TOBACCOCONTROL LEGALCONSORTIUM, MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT:
AN OVERVIEW (2015), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-
fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5KS-M8ZB].
24 Id.
25 Under the tort law idea of contributory negligence, “a plaintiff was totally
barred from recovery if they were in any way negligent in causing the accident, even if the
negligence of the defendant was much more serious.” Contributory Negligence, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/contributory_negligence [https://perma.cc/4UD8-VM7A].
26 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 23.
27 Id.
28 Master Settlement Agreement, PUBLIC HEALTH L. CTR., http://publichealth
lawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-
agreement [https://perma.cc/F58W-94PR]. The MSA also restricted the targeting of
youth in tobacco advertising, banned brand name sponsorships and free tobacco product
samples except in certain facilities, prohibited companies from hiding negative health-
related information, and more. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 23.
29 Overview of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
supra note 5.
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and state regulations and were not sold to minors.30 Before
signing the legislation into effect, President Obama noted in a
speech that children are “aggressively targeted as customers by
the tobacco industry” and are “exposed to a constant and
insidious barrage of advertising where they live, where they
learn, and where they play,” tempting them to experiment with
tobacco products.31
The Tobacco Control Act also required much stricter
product warning labels on both tobacco products and their
advertisements.32 Under the new legislation, if a company
wanted to make a claim that their product specifically was of
modified risk or reduced harm to the public relative to other
dangerous nicotine products, it had to support the claim with
sufficient scientific evidence in order to secure FDA approval.33
The Tobacco Control Act also required extensive disclosure of
ingredients to the FDA in all tobacco products, but still left it to
state authorities to regulate the industry in certain categories.34
Congress intended for the Tobacco Control Act to give the FDA
authority “to impose appropriate regulatory controls on the
tobacco industry.”35 Calling this legislation a “bipartisan victory”
because it was overwhelmingly passed in both houses of
30 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act—An Overview, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/ucm246129.htm [https://perma.cc/2TDM-E9SX].
31 Barack Obama, XLIV President of the United States of America: 2009–2017,
Remarks on Signing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 22, 2009) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=
86316 [https://perma.cc/64ZF-EJWS]. President Obama also noted that this legislation
was crucial because
[o]ne out of every five children in our country are now current smokers by the
time they leave high school. Each day, 1,000 young people under the age of 18
become new, regular, daily smokers. And almost 90 percent of all smokers
began at or before their 18th birthday. . . . And I also know that kids today
don’t just start smoking for no reason.
Id.
32 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2012)) Specifically, these
labels included the following: “WARNING: This product can cause mouth cancer.
WARNING: This product can cause gum disease and tooth loss. WARNING: This product
is not a safe alternative to cigarettes. WARNING: Smokeless tobacco is addictive.” Id.
33 Section 911 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—Modified Risk
Tobacco Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/
guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm262077.htm#Postmarket_Surveillance_
and_Studies [https://perma.cc/7AE8-N46C].
34 Id.
35 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 123 Stat.
1776, 1783.
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Congress, President Obama noted the new regulations would
surely be “a step that will save lives and dollars.”36
The Tobacco Control Act did not, however, address every
class of tobacco product, namely those that were relatively new to
the market.37 This created a major gap in regulation. While part of
the Tobacco Control Act applied to a variety of different groups of
tobacco products, like cigarettes, menthol, and chewing tobacco,38
the general restrictions failed to include products like cigars,
hookah tobacco, and e-cigarettes, which became popular in the
years following the passage of the act because of the gap in
regulation and technological innovation. The large unregulated
marketplace for e-cigarettes, as one regulator put it, created an
environment similar to the “Wild, Wild West.”39
B. Emergence of the E-Cigarette and Research on Its Health
Effects
In 1965, Herbert Gilbert received a patent for the first
smokeless non-tobacco cigarette, and the patent was approved
two years later.40 Though he failed to commercialize his design,
others helped bring his ideas to fruition years later.41
Specifically, Chinese pharmacist and inventor Hon Lik created
the first commercial electronic cigarette in 2003, which was
eventually introduced to the U. S. market between 2006 and
2007.42 Modern day e-cigarettes are battery-operated devices
that contain a liquid solution sometimes made up of nicotine,
flavoring chemicals, and other chemicals.43 While there are
36 Barack Obama, XLIV President of the United States of America: 2009–2017,
Remarks on Signing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009,
supra note 31.
37 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 123 Stat.
1776, 1827.
38 See id.
39 Mitch Zeller, Protecting the Public and Especially Kids from the Dangers of
Tobacco Products, Including E-Cigarettes, Cigars and Hookah Tobacco, U.S. FOOD&DRUG
ADMIN. (Aug. 8, 2016), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/08/protecting-the-public-
and-especially-kids-from-the-dangers-of-tobacco-products-including-e-cigarettes-cigars-and-
hookah-tobacco/ [https://perma.cc/MA76-A63Z].
40 P.H., A Case of the Vapers, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/03/e-cigarette-patent-wars [https://perma.cc/
BD6E-K6M9].
41 Historical Timeline of Electronic Cigarettes, CONSUMER ADVOCATES FOR
SMOKE FREE ALTERNATIVES ASSOCIATION, http://casaa.org/historical-timeline-of-
electronic-cigarettes/ [https://perma.cc/765S-SCLT].
42 Id.
43 Electronic Cigarettes (E-Cigarettes), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE,
(June 2017), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/electronic-cigarettes-e-
cigarettes [https://perma.cc/DU39-4AWM].
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many variations of e-cigarettes, the general technology and
anatomy of an e-cigarettes is consistent across brands.44
Despite the FDA’s decision to treat e-cigarettes as
traditional cigarettes, the agency has also acknowledged that
e-cigarettes have certain qualities making them less harmful
relative to other tobacco products.45 Although there is little
research on the health effects of e-cigarettes,46 the FDA has
passed regulations treating e-cigarettes the same way that
traditional cigarettes are treated. At the same time, the
agency “recognizes that some tobacco products have the
potential to be less harmful than others.”47 The FDA
maintains that e-cigarettes have both risks and benefits, like
the fact that e-cigarettes have a reduced toxicity content
relative to conventional cigarettes, and some individuals use
e-cigarettes to quit smoking conventional cigarettes.48 While
the FDA has not conducted or funded research of its own to
investigate the health benefits and risks of the product, the
FDA nevertheless “encourages manufacturers to explore
product innovations that would maximize potential benefits
and minimize risks.”49
A series of negative health studies likely informed the
FDA’s attitude toward regulating the e-cigarette industry. The
American Lung Association contends that a 2009 study found
“detectable levels of toxic cancer-causing chemicals, including an
ingredient used in anti-freeze, in two leading brands of e-
cigarettes and [eighteen] various cartridges.”50 A study
conducted in 2014 found that “aerosol from e-cigarettes with a
higher voltage level contains more formaldehyde, another
carcinogen with the potential to cause cancer.”51 Other studies also
found e-cigarettes to contain chemicals like diacetyl, a flavored
chemical often added to popcorn for a buttery flavor. This chemical
is said to be linked to an irreversible lung condition called “popcorn
lung.”52 This series of negative health studies likely prompted the
FDA to reconsider its monitoring of the e-cigarette industry, and in
turn broaden its regulatory reach.
44 Id.
45 The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm506676.htm [https://perma.cc/F93X-KUZG].
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 E-cigarettes and Lung Health, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.lung.org/stop-
smoking/smoking-facts/e-cigarettes-and-lung-health.html [https://perma.cc/VR3S-ZUNV].
51 Id.
52 Id. (footnote omitted).
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Other studies show that e-cigarettes create positive
health benefits in comparison to traditional cigarettes. The
Royal College of Physicians in London, United Kingdom
recently reported that the use of e-cigarettes among adults
who have never been smokers is quite rare.53 That being said,
e-cigarettes are most effective when used by smokers to assist
them in quitting smoking. The Royal College of Physicians
reported that the “hazard to health arising from long-term
vapour inhalation from the e-cigarettes available today is
unlikely to exceed 5% of the harm from smoking tobacco.”54
This staggering statistic illustrates the practical need for
modified risk alternatives to conventional cigarette smoking.
The study concludes that although “there is a need for
regulation to reduce direct and indirect adverse effects of e-
cigarette use,” in the interest of public health, the regulation
should be prohibited from significantly inhibiting the
“development and use of harm-reduction products by
smokers.”55 John Britton, the director of the U.K. Center for
Tobacco and Alcohol Studies at the University of Nottingham,
helped produce the report and believes that e-cigarettes are
the “first genuinely new way of helping people stop smoking
that has come along in decades.”56
A study conducted by the Cleveland Clinic also points to
evidence that e-cigarettes may even be a safer alternative to
regularly smoking conventional cigarettes. One study comparing
the toxicants in e-cigarettes with regular cogitates found that
“[e]-liquids and aerosols have toxicant levels much lower than
those observed with tobacco smoke, and their carcinogen content
is ‘negligible.’”57 In reviewing twelve e-cigarette brands, Roswell
Park Cancer Institute researchers found that toxicant levels
53 ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKE: TOBACCO HARM
REDUCTION 186 (2016), https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/nicotine-without-
smoke-tobacco-harm-reduction-0 [https://perma.cc/3MLH-3NDP] (PDF available for
download from site).
54 Id. at 189.
55 Id. at 190.
56 Sabrina Tavernise, Smokers Urged to Switch to E-Cigarettes by British
Medical Group, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/
health/e-cigarettes-vaping-quitting-smoking-royal-college-of-physicians.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/G2FL-R8P6]. John Britton also stated that e-cigarettes “have the
potential to help half or more of all smokers get off cigarettes. That’s a huge health
benefit, bigger than just about any medical intervention.” Id.
57 Amy Orciari Herman, E-Cigarettes Safer Alternative to Regular Cigarettes (July
31, 2014), http://www.jwatch.org/fw109119/2014/07/31/e-cigarettes-safer-alternative-regular-
cigarettes? query=pfw [https://perma.cc/HG9Y-8835]; see also Raul Seballos, New Research:
E-Cigs Safer Alternative to Regular Cigarettes, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Aug. 22, 2014),
https://health.clevelandclinic.org/2014/08/new-research-e-cigs-safer-alternative-to-
regular-cigarettes/ [https://perma.cc/65YG-EH5Q].
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“were 9 [to] 450 times lower [in e-cigarettes] than in cigarette
smoke.”58 The conflicting evidence and lack of conclusive studies
throughout the United States and beyond on this topic
illustrates the practical need for additional substantive research
and evidence to support the FDA’s conclusion in the Deeming
Rule that e-cigarettes are equally as dangerous as conventional
cigarettes, and therefore should be regulated in the same exact
manner. The FDA’s position—creating outright regulations that
treat e-cigarettes the same way as traditional cigarettes—is not
only an unauthorized extension of congressional power, but also
threatens to wipe out an industry that could have a positive
impact on American health.
II. THE “DEEMING RULE”
Because the Tobacco Control Act gave the FDA
significant power to regulate the tobacco industry, the agency
subsequently promulgated the Deeming Rule, a series of
regulations imposing strict standards and requiring companies
to pay high fees with mandatory product applications in order to
obtain market approval.59 The Tobacco Control Act gives the
FDA authority to “provide new and flexible enforcement
authority to ensure that there is effective oversight of the
tobacco industry’s efforts to develop, introduce, and promote less
harmful tobacco products.”60 In formulating the Deeming Rule,
the FDA decided to regulate the previously unregulated markets
of e-cigarettes, hookah tobacco, and cigars to ensure consumer
knowledge of health risks and prevent another public health
crisis like that of traditional cigarettes, which were widely used
to the detriment of an unknowing public.61 This broad grant of
authority under the Tobacco Control Act applies to the creation
and enforcement of the Deeming Rule.
A. Overview
The Deeming Rule extends the FDA’s authority over all
tobacco products, as well as their component parts. The new rule
58 Maciej Lukasz Goniewicz et al., Levels of Selected Carcinogens and Toxicants
in Vapour from Electronic Cigarettes, BMJ JOURNALS (Mar. 6, 2013) http://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2013/03/05/tobaccocontrol-2012-050859.abstract
[https://perma.cc/LPC4-X9T2]; see also Seballos, supra note 57.
59 Overview of the Family SmokingPrevention andTobacco Control Act, supranote 5.
60 H.R. REP. NO. 110-762, at 6 (2008).
61 Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco Use—United States,
1900-1999, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm4843a2.htm [https://perma.cc/98JX-P6TQ].
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“extends the FDA’s regulatory authority to all tobacco products,
including e-cigarettes62 . . . all cigars (including premium ones),
hookah (also called waterpipe tobacco), pipe tobacco, nicotine
gels, and dissolvables that did not previously fall under the
FDA’s authority.”63 The products now regulated—beyond typical
tobacco products—also include components and parts of newly
deemed products, e-liquids, atomizers, batteries, cartomizers,
cartridges, tank systems, flavors for e-liquids, vials that contain
e-liquids, programmable software, digital display or lights, and
more.64 The FDA defines “Component or Part” to mean “any
software or assembly of materials intended or reasonably
expected: (1) To alter or affect the tobacco product’s performance,
composition, constituents or characteristics; or (2) to be used
with or for the human consumption of a tobacco product.”65 In
essence, the FDA created a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory regime
to encompass a broad variety of tobacco and non-tobacco
products in the agency’s strict tobacco regulation.66
Beyond including these new categories of tobacco
products, the Deeming Rule requires “manufacturers of newly
regulated tobacco products that were not on the market as of
February 15, 2007 . . . to show that products meet the applicable
public health standard set by the law. And those manufacturers
will have to receive marketing authorization from the FDA.”67
Because e-cigarettes are relatively new products in the tobacco
market throughout the United States, this requirement will
effectively apply to almost every company and product in the
industry. The new rule also provides a broad grant of authority
to the FDA, by enabling the agency to “issue further regulations
related to such products that are appropriate for the protection
to the public health.”68
B. Registration Requirements: Burdensome PMTA Pathway
Because manufacturers of these newly regulated
categories of tobacco products must register their products with
62 E-cigarettes “are also called electronic cigarettes or electronic nicotine
delivery systems (ENDS).” The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, supra note 45.
63 Id.
64 Vaporizers, E-Cigarettes, and other Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems
(ENDS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/
ProductsIngredientsComponents/ucm456610.htm [https://perma.cc/T59L-GWEM].
65 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975.
66 Complaint of Right To Be Smoke-Free Coalition at 13, No. 16-01210, 2016
WL 3586148, consolidated as Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d 360 (D.D.C.
2017) [hereinafter Right To Be Smoke-Free Coalition Complaint].
67 The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, supra note 45.
68 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 29075.
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the FDA, there are three avenues for approval: substantial
equivalence (SE),69 substantial equivalence exemption (SE
exemption),70 and premarket tobacco application (PMTA).71 The
PMTA pathway is by far the most complex and burdensome path
for approval and, for most new products, the PMTA pathway for
market approval is inevitable. The FDA-imposed grandfather
date of February 15, 2007 poses a threat to ENDS
manufacturers because the majority of these products did not
enter the commercial marketplace until after this date and so
would not qualify for the simpler SE route.72 For ENDS, this
almost always requires a PMTA for sellers.
The process of filing a PMTA for a product currently on
the market is quite tedious and financially burdensome,
especially as it must occur within twenty-four months of the date
the Deeming Rule was passed: August 8, 2016.73 For products
that are not yet on the market, sellers must receive market
approval before any commercial sale.74 The process first requires
“full reports of all information, published or known to, or which
should reasonably be known to, the applicant, concerning
investigations which have been made to show the health risks of
such tobacco product and whether such tobacco product presents
less risk than other tobacco products.”75 These reports include
both clinical and nonclinical investigations and studies
“assessing constituents of tobacco or tobacco smoke, toxicology,
consumer exposure, and consumer use profiles.”76 The FDA
explicitly requires each PMTA to include a full investigation of
health risks for each individual product application, and intends
for those applications to include extensive studies proving their
safety or modified risk to society.77
A PMTA also requires sellers to disclose the ingredients
and properties of the tobacco product and a description of the
69 The SE pathway is the simplest and requires a manufacturer selling tobacco
products only to show that the new tobacco product is substantially equivalent to a
tobacco product that was commercially available before or as of February 15, 2007. 21
U.S.C. § 387j(a) (2012).
70 The SE exemption pathway, the second route for approval, allows the FDA
to approve tobacco products for the commercial market that only make minor changes to
existing tobacco products. Id. § 387e(j).
71 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28990–91.
72 Historical Timeline of Electronic Cigarettes, supra note 41.
73 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28978.
74 Id.
75 21 U.S.C. § 387j(b)(1)(A).
76 U.S. FOOD&DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATIONS FOR PREMARKET REVIEW OFNEW
TOBACCO PRODUCTS: DRAFTGUIDANCE 9 (2011),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/
UCM273425.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HXX-MWB7].
77 21 U.S.C. § 387j(b)(1)(A).
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manufacturing, processing, and packing facilities. It requires
manufacturers to submit “information to show that such aspect
of such tobacco product fully meets such tobacco product
standard or adequate information to justify any deviation from
such standard,”78 as well as samples of the tobacco product and
components and proposed labeling.79
In July 2017, the FDA announced a delay in its plan for
e-cigarette regulation that would subsequently delay the
timeline for the PMTA process and other approval avenues for
newly regulated products on the market.80 Specifically, newly
regulated combustibles on the market as of August 8, 2016, now
have until August 8, 2021, to submit applications, while newly
regulated non-combustibles on the market as of August 8, 2016,
will have until August 8, 2022.81 The FDA announced its desire
to take this additional time to “make certain that the [agency] is
striking an appropriate balance between regulation and
encouraging development of innovative tobacco products that
may be less dangerous than cigarettes.”82 Though the FDA has
extended this deadline, it is nevertheless committed to the
regulatory scheme.83 The mere act of delaying the process to
pursue additional research and analysis is a concession to e-
cigarette companies, illustrating that the Deeming Rule is in
fact burdensome and may not adequately assess the costs to
companies manufacturing and selling these products.
While the FDA does not disclose a specific fee for the
PMTA application, the FDA has estimated that the process will
require 1,500 hours per product, in turn costing several
thousand dollars per application.84 This means that each
individual product, even those that are similar, that a
78 Id. § 387j(b)(1)(D).
79 Id. § 387j(b)(1)(C), (E).
80 Sheila Kaplan, F.D.A. Delays Rules That Would Have Limited E-Cigarettes
on Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/health/
electronic-cigarette-tobacco-nicotine-fda.html [https://perma.cc/FVG6-K5T5].
81 FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of
Tobacco-related Disease, Death, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 28, 2017), https://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm568923.htm [https://
perma.cc/M273-YLKX].
82 Id.
83 Id. Additionally, the FDA noted on May 3, 2017 that this delay “will allow
new leadership at the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services
additional time to more fully consider issues raised by the final rule that are now the
subject of multiple lawsuits in federal court.” May 2017: Web Statement, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (May 3, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/NewsEvents/
ucm556562.htm [https://perma.cc/9586-GK4Q].
84 Kaleigh Rogers, Five Ways the FDA’s New Regulations Will Transform the
Vaping Industry, MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016, 4:50 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/
read/five-ways-the-fdas-new-regulatio`ns-with-transform-the-vaping-industry-e-
cigarettes [https://perma.cc/LQ89-M8UG].
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manufacturer makes and sells will require about 1,500 hours
spent to obtain FDA approval.85 Moreover, “[t]he FDA estimates
it will only receive about 750 PMTAs each year and since
companies only have the next two years to apply for their
existing products, that works out to about 1,500 PMTAs.”86
Because PMTAs are filed per product and not per company, the
more than 4,000 vape manufacturers in the United States will
not be able to afford filing fees of PMTAs, which the FDA clearly
anticipates in its low total PMTA estimation.87
Because the PMTA process requires an application for
each product—even for every flavor and every nicotine level
of e-liquid—the process will surely burden companies’ time
and revenue. Based on its Regulatory Impact Analysis, the
FDA predicted that the rule would cost between $66 and $77
million per year for the PMTA of newly deemed products.88
For example, Apollo Electronic Cigarettes, a California-
based fine electronic vaping company, makes twelve
different varieties of fruit flavors, each with five different
nicotine level options.89 Based on the company’s product
variation, the Deeming Rule requires Apollo submit sixty
different PMTAs to the FDA for approval. If each PMTA will
cost them 1,500 hours, Apollo will spend a total of 90,000
hours just on this one product variation. Although Apollo is
a large manufacturer and may not go out of business due to
the costly regulation, these requirements would likely
destroy smaller companies that operate by manufacturing
similar product varieties. The FDA admits that the Deeming
Rule would accelerate the consolidation of the e-cigarette
industry, which would then cause smaller, poorer e-cigarette
and component manufacturers to forgo the PMTA process
altogether, changing their business models90 and reducing
the market.91 An application denial would inevitably crush
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DEEMING TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO BE
SUBJECT TO THE FOOD, DRUG, ANDCOSMETICACT, ASAMENDED BY THE FAMILY SMOKING
PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT; REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE SALE AND
DISTRIBUTION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND REQUIRED WARNING STATEMENTS FOR
TOBACCO PRODUCTPACKAGES ANDADVERTISEMENTS 114–16 (2016) https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFD/UCM394933.pdf [https://perma.cc/642X-PJLX].
89 Rogers, supra note 84.
90 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975, 28990. If products do not receive FDA
approval, either because the company fails to file a PMTA in time or the product is
rejected post-filing, the products are not allowed to be sold in the market. Id. at 28978.
91 DEP’T OFHEALTH ANDHUMAN SERVS., supra note 88, at 78. The FDA expands
on the likelihood of product consolidation, noting “[i]t may not be profitable for firms to bear
the per-product costs of this final rule for all products currently marketed. Given the
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large portions of a company’s revenue, forcing it to spend
money to achieve compliance or completely exit the market
in that particular space.
C. Influx of Litigation
Since the FDA’s May 2016 announcement of its plan to
release the Deeming Rule, many e-cigarette and vaping
companies filed suit against the FDA. Nicopure Labs LLC, a
Florida manufacturer of e-cigarette devices and liquid
nicotine, filed suit on May 10, 2016.92 On June 20, 2016, the
Right To Be Smoke-Free Coalition, along with many other
vaping advocacy groups across America, filed a complaint
against the FDA, the FDA’s Commissioner of Food and Drugs
Robert Califf, and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services Sylvia Burwell.93 A few weeks later, Judge Amy
Berman Jackson, a judge sitting in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, consolidated the lawsuits
with Nicopure’s most recent complaint because both groups
filed suit in the same federal court.94 The groups together
argued, among other things, that (1) the FDA’s Deeming Rule
violates the First Amendment by prohibiting truthful, non-
misleading product statements; (2) that the FDA overstates
the benefits and understates the costs of the rule,95 and (3) the
APA makes it “unlawful and unreasonable” for the FDA to
define electronic nicotine delivery systems as a “tobacco
product.”96 In July 2017, Judge Berman Jackson ruled in favor
of the FDA, stating that the agency acted within the scope of
its authority under the Tobacco Control Act and APA in
classifying e-cigarettes and nicotine-free liquids and
potential compliance costs, we assume that 5 percent of baseline newly deemed combusted
products . . . will exit from the market rather than submit a marketing application.” Id.
Additionally, the FDA’s “analysis reflects a significant degree of product exit and
consolidation . . . . [T]his will be accompanied by changes in the composition of products
available on the market, given the requirements of premarket review.” Id. at 80.
92 Nicopure Labs Complaint, supra note 16.
93 Right To Be Smoke-Free Coalition Complaint, supra note 66, at 1 (groups
included American E-Liquid Manufacturing Standards Association (AEMSA), American
Vaping Association (AVA), Electronic Vaping Coalition of America, Georgia Smoke Free
Association, Kentucky Vaping Retailers Association/Kentucky Smoke Free Association,
Louisiana Vaping Association, Maryland Vape Professionals, Ohio Vapor Trade Association,
New Jersey Vapor Retailers Coalition, and Tennessee Smoke Free Association).
94 Lydia Wheeler, Lawsuits Mount Against FDA Regs on E-cigarettes, HILL, (July
10, 2016 8:00 AM ET) http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/287056-lawsuits-mount-
against-fda-regs-on-e-cigarettes [https://perma.cc/M3YE-PVZB]. See Nicopure Labs, LLC v.
Food and Drug Admin., 266 F. Supp. 3d 360 (D.D.C. 2017).
95 Wheeler, supra note 94.
96 Id.
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components to be tobacco products.97 In supporting her
finding, Judge Berman Jackson stated that the regulation
only subjects the products to “heightened regulation, but the
deeming decision does not—and could not—completely ban
those products from the market.”98
A number of other companies have since filed suit,
claiming violations of federal statutes, as well as constitutional
rights. Altria Group, Inc., the parent company of both John
Middleton and Philip Morris USA, also filed suit.99 Lost Art
Liquids LLC, a California manufacturer of e-cigarette devices
and liquid nicotine, filed a lawsuit against the FDA, claiming the
FDA “failed to consider the impact its rule would have on small
businesses in violation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
(RFA).”100 In its complaint, Lost Art Liquids LLC also discussed
the FDA’s failure to consider the obviously large costs to
companies in its cost-benefit analysis of the rule, and the
company further claimed violations of both the First and Fifth
Amendments.101 Several cigar companies and associations have
also filed suit against the FDA for similar reasons.102
Beyond companies, outspoken politician Larry Faircloth,
a Republican in the West Virginia House of Delegates, is also
suing the FDA over the new rules. In his complaint, Faircloth
claims that “he used e-cigarettes and other vaping devices to quit
smoking and will ‘likely return to the unhealthy habit of using
tobacco products’ as a result of the rule.”103 He notes that the
premarket review process is burdensome, especially in light of
the arbitrary grandfather date, and believes the new regulations
will stifle innovation in the tobacco industry.104
These lawsuits are sure to give the FDA a run for itsmoney,
challenging the agency’s federal constitutional authority to pass
the Deeming Rule and claiming a failure by the FDA to adequately
provide evidentiary support to back the new regulations. Because
97 Nicopure Labs, LLC, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 367–68.
98 Id. at 391.
99 Mike Esterl, Altria Sues U.S. to Keep ‘Black & Mild’ Cigar Name, WALL ST.
J., (May 26, 2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/altria-sues-u-s-to-keep-black-mild-cigar-
name-1464282368 [https://perma.cc/35CU-EJZH].
100 Wheeler, supra note 94.
101 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 14, at 3 (“[T]he rule’s
prohibition on using modified risk descriptors and the requirement that products bear
warning labels violate the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and the Fifth
Amendment’s protection from unlawful governmental takings.”).
102 Wheeler, supra note 94.
103 Id.
104 Larry W. Faircloth v. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Public Health and
Tobacco Policy Center, http://tobaccopolicycenter.org/tobacco-control/recent-cases/fda-
deeming-rule/larry-w-faircloth/ [https://perma.cc/2GFV-HY8B].
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the FDA failed to consider alternative methods of regulation that
were less invasive given inconclusive science, the agency is now in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
III. VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
A. Purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
in 1946,105 to create comprehensive procedures for government
agencies to follow when performing regulatory activities,
including rulemaking.106 Section 553 of the APA details the
requirements for rulemaking.107 Specifically, it requires the
rulemaking agency to allow interested parties to participate in
the process through “submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”108
The inclusion of this provision illustrates Congress’s intention to
ensure a democratic process for an interested party that chooses
to challenge a regulation.
If an interested party files suit against a federal agency
claiming that the agency acted in violation of the APA, the
claims will be reviewed using mandatory guidelines that apply
to the scope of federal agency actions.109 In reviewing a challenge,
a court is authorized to set aside a law it deems an arbitrary
abuse of discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence.110 An
agency rule is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied too heavily on specific factors, failed to consider a
crucial point, explained a decision in a manner that disregards
agency evidence, or “is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”111 The reviewing court cannot itself create a
reasonable basis for the agency’s action that the agency has not
already submitted to the court for review.112
Particularly, the reviewing court must determine
whether the agency has both examined data and explained a
105 Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237, 79 Cong. Ch.
324, 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237, 79 Cong. Ch. 324 (June 11, 1946).
106 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
107 See id.
108 Id. § 553(c).
109 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
110 Id. § 706(2)(a), (e).
111 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
112 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
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rational reason for its action.113 An agency’s discretion is not
without boundaries, and the agency must have sufficiently
investigated and considered data and facts,114 and “articulated a
satisfactory explanation for its action based upon the record.”115 If
the agency fails to recognize a critical part of the issue or offers an
explanation that contradicts agency evidence, the reviewing court
can vacate the regulation.116 When a party claims an agency action
is arbitrary, a reviewing court must engage in substantial inquiry
to determine the viability of the claim.117 Though courts afford
much deference to federal agencies and the burden is on the
challenging party,118 there are nevertheless narrow opportunities
for parties to critically challenge federal regulations.
These requirements imply, but do not explicitly require,
a cost-benefit analysis, though many courts have read the APA
to require this type of analysis. Specifically, the APA requires an
agency to publicly submit a description of the proposed
regulation, leaving the agency vulnerable to criticism both by a
reviewing court and public.119 Recent case law suggests that
upon reviewing challenged laws, courts favor a cost-benefit
analysis, but a rule is not necessarily vacated just because it fails
a cost-benefit analysis.120
The Deeming Rule should be vacated due to an
unreasonable cost-benefit analysis and the FDA’s failure to
consider alternative measures of regulation that would inform the
public, while preserving a successful industry. The SupremeCourt,
inMotor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., found that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s (NHTSA) rule eliminating the requirement that
new motor vehicles produced after a certain date have automatic
seatbelts or airbags to protect the safety of vehicle occupants121 was
113 Id. at 48 (holding “an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner”). A reviewing court must determine whether “the decision
was based on a consideration of . . . relevant factors [or if] there [was] a clear error of
judgment.” Id. at 43.
114 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (quotingMotor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43).
115 California v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990).
116 Id. at 1230 (citingMotor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43).
117 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US 402, 415 (1971).
118 See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Defense Council., Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983).
119 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
120 Yifan Zhou, Is Quantified Cost-Benefit Analysis a Requirement for
Rulemaking?, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (June 1, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/
2016/06/01/zhou-quantified-cost-benefit-rulemaking/ [https://perma.cc/LY4X-Z2CW].
121 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–57
(1983). The NHTSA stated that it no longer found the automatic restraint requirement to
produce safety benefits, which was the basis for its rescission of the rule. Id. at 38. Soon after,
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arbitrary and capricious, and that the agency failed to conduct a
fair cost-benefit analysis. In analyzing the scope of review, the
Court noted that “the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow,” as a court is not meant to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the applicable agency.122 Though difficult to prove, if
the court finds that the agency failed to consider a crucial aspect of
the issue or relied on factors it should not have considered, the rule
will be deemed arbitrary and capricious under Section 706 of the
APA.123 Under NHTSA rules, the agency had to consider all
relevant safety information and data before passing and
implementing a new regulation. Upon performing a cost-benefit
analysis, the agency concluded that “incremental costs of the
requirements were no longer reasonable.”124 Justice White, writing
for the Court, held “that the agency failed to present an adequate
basis and explanation for rescinding the . . . requirement
and . . . must either consider the matter further or adhere to or
amend [the] Standard along lines which its analysis supports.”125
The Court held that the NHTSA “was too quick to dismiss the
safety benefits of automatic seatbelts,”126 and vacated the agency’s
rescission altogether.
Likewise, the Supreme Court, inMichigan v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
failed to adequately consider the costs of amendments to the
Clean Air Act.127 In 2012, the EPA announced that electric utility
steam generating units were emitting mercury, a chemical
hazardous to public health, and regulation was therefore
“appropriate and necessary.”128 State and industry labor groups
challenged the regulations, citing the high costs of compliance
with the regulations that the EPA failed to consider. In his
opinion, Justice Scalia stated that it was unreasonable for the
EPA to decline to consider the cost to power plants, though the
agency was not required to do a full, formal cost-benefit analysis
prior to passing the regulations.129 He noted, however, that a
court cannot uphold a regulation merely because there are
ancillary benefits that outweigh the costs.130 Though courts
insurance companies sued the NHTSA, claiming there was a clear safety need for automatic
seatbelts and airbags and arguing that the agency’s new regulation was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to consider the evidence. Id. at 39–40.
122 Id. at 43.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 54.
125 Id. at 34.
126 Id. at 51.
127 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
128 Id. at 2716.
129 Id. at 2711.
130 Id.
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provide much deference to agencies that consider both costs and
benefits in their analyses of a regulation before it is applied to
the market, costs cannot be deemed irrelevant.
B. Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
A reviewing court should analyze the costs relative to the
benefits of the Deeming Rule to determine whether its passage
is arbitrary under the APA. Of its many purposes, the Tobacco
Control Act gives the FDA authority “to provide new and flexible
enforcement authority to ensure that there is effective oversight
of the tobacco industry’s efforts to develop, introduce, and promote
less harmful tobacco products.”131 This broad statement gives the
FDA discretion to determine ultimate goals and the necessary
steps to implement President Obama’s goal of reducing tobacco-
related deaths.132 Under the Deeming Rule, the FDA has decided
to regulate any product that is “made or derived from tobacco that
is intended for human consumption.”133 Within this regulatory
sphere, the FDA proposes to regulate both tobacco products and
non-tobacco components all in an identical manner. This is
unjustified, as the effects of each product vastly differ, warranting
diverse regulations tailored to each product.
C. Failure to Assess Costs
The FDA’s failure to adequately assess the costs of the
regulatory scheme in place violates the APA. Federal agencies
“must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of
compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate
and necessary.”134 In publishing the Deeming Rule, the FDA
applied a cost-benefit analysis and concluded in its final rule
that “the benefits of the final rule justify the costs,”135 primarily
because of the health benefits associated with the regulation.
The FDA stated that the reduction of e-cigarette users would in
turn reduce the amount of smoking overall, including usage of
traditional, combustible cigarettes.136 Specifically, the 2014
Surgeon General Report stated that “the promotion of
noncombustible products is much more likely to provide public
131 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
132 Id. at 1777.
133 Id. § 101(a) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1)).
134 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2711–12 (holding that the
“EPA interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the
decision to regulate power plants”).
135 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975, 29075.
136 Id. at 28985.
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health benefits only in an environment where the appeal,
accessibility, promotion, and use of cigarettes and other
combusted tobacco products are being rapidly reduced.”137 The
report, as summarized in the final rule, went on to say that in a
situation where a larger category of products is proven to be
beneficial to the public, regulation is warranted if individual
products within that larger, overarching category raise health
concerns.138 Despite this blanket conclusion, the FDA was
nevertheless unable to quantify the potential benefits of the
Deeming Rule.139 Specifically, the FDA noted that the “direct
benefits of making each of the newly deemed tobacco products
subject to the requirements of chapter IX of the [Food, Drug and
Cosmetic] Act are difficult to quantify, and [the FDA] cannot
predict the size of these benefits at this time.”140 Though the
agency attempted to sketch the anticipated costs of the
regulation, it nevertheless conceded that costs could be
exorbitantly higher than quoted.
The FDA’s failure to adequately conduct research on the
actual cost of compliance prior to imposing strict regulations
illustrates an error in APA compliance. By “entirely fail[ing] to
consider an important aspect of the problem,”141 the FDA acted
in violation of the APA and must reconsider the high costs and
unknown benefits of the regulation.
D. Total Disregard of Benefits
The FDA also disregarded the potential health benefits
of ENDS products relative to traditional cigarettes. In essence,
the agency concedes that e-cigarettes are less harmful than
traditional cigarettes, yet still regulates the two products in the
same manner.142 The FDA notes that “[r]esearchers recognize that
the effects from nicotine exposure by inhalation . . . are likely not
responsible for the high prevalence of tobacco-related death and
disease in this country.”143 Nicopure, one of the many vaping
companies that has filed suit against the FDA, consistently tells
137 Id. at 28984.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 28981.
140 Id.
141 That problem being the high, understated costs and unknown health
benefits. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
142 Michael Siegel, POV: New FDA Regulations on Vaping Products a Failure,
BU TODAY (July 13, 2016), https://www.bu.edu/today/2016/fda-vaping-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/63MJ-RCF9].
143 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28981.
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consumers that with vaping, “nothing is burned,” “no smoke is
released,” and “no ash” is created.144 Nicopure also contends that e-
cigarettes release only “a fraction of the 4000 chemicals currently
found in standard tobacco cigarettes.”145
By “arbitrarily discount[ing] the safety benefits offered by
vaping devices and e-liquids”146 and undermining the costs, the
Deeming Rule ignores reality in favor of a burdensome approval
process. The effect of a strict regulation like the Deeming Rule will
not only disrupt the e-cigarette marketplace through financially
burdensome processes, but it will also halt innovation. Though the
FDA contends “the employment of the premarket authorities could
create incentives for producers to develop products that are less
dangerous when consumed, less likely to lead to initiation of tobacco
use, and/or easier to quit,”147 the agency has failed to consider the
realities of the legislation as required by the APA. Some studies
show that usage of e-cigarettes is linked to a decreased use of
traditional cigarettes, predicting that “innovations are likely to
improve the substitutability of e-cigarettes for cigarettes, unless
there are major regulatory hurdles for introducing new products.”148
Dr. Michael Siegel, a professor in the Department of Community
Health Sciences at the Boston University School of Public Health
and practicing doctor for over twenty-five years, noted that the
FDA’s legislation will “prohibit[] manufacturers frommaking safety
improvements to an e-cigarette if they do not undergo the multi-
year, multi-million dollar approval process.”149
The Deeming Rule effectively eliminates an entire
marketplace of activity that mitigates the effects of traditional
cigarettes that are scientifically proven to be deadly. This will
cause those who have previously turned to e-cigarettes as a
mitigating alternative to traditional cigarettes to go back to
traditional cigarettes, primarily because the e-cigarette
marketplace will vastly diminish with these regulations. What’s
more, the extremely expensive, burdensome PMTA requirements
could also cause e-cigarettes to drastically rise in price so that
144 Jacob Sullum, FDA E-Cigarette Regulations Give Smoking a Boost, REASON
(Aug. 15, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/08/15/fda-e-cigarette-regulations-give-
smoking [https://perma.cc/R9HJ-ZEM6].
145 Id.
146 Nicopure Labs Complaint, supra note 16, at 10.
147 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975, 28983.
148 Levy, et al., Potential Deaths Averted In USA By Replacing Cigarettes with
E-Cigarettes, 27 TOBACCOCONTROLBMJ J., 18, 22 (2017), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/tobaccocontrol/27/1/18.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/97VH-LVHM].
149 Christopher Russell, Unintended Consequences of the FDA’s E-cigarette
Regulations, HILL, (Aug. 25, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/
healthcare/292542-unintended-consequences-of-the-fdas-e-cigarette-regulations [https://
perma.cc/32HK-E4FQ].
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companies can keep up with growing costs associated with
production. This wouldmake the price of e-cigarettes to consumers
much higher, thereby eliminating consumer ability to choose the
less harmful alternative to smoking traditional cigarettes.
The Deeming Rule also disrupts innovations and
“advances in public health while preserving the status quo that
existed in 2007, i.e., a market dominated by cigarettes.”150 In
effect, the regulation blocks beneficial product developments of
vaping systems and components that could make them easier
and safer to use.151 By intensely regulating a product that is not
conclusively and scientifically linked to tobacco-related death the
way traditional cigarettes are linked to death, entrepreneurs will
not invest in technology and research to make e-cigarettes safer
and healthier for the public.152 The FDA’s failure to identify and
further research these discrepancies prior to regulation shows a
clear violation of the APA’s required cost-benefit analysis.
Despite the FDA’s July 2017 news release stating that it
would revise the application timelines to facilitate “public
dialogue about lowering nicotine levels in combustible cigarettes
to non-addictive levels through achievable product standards,”
the agency nevertheless maintains the rules currently put into
place.153 A mere timing extension without true analysis of each
individual regulation and its effect on the industry does not
survive a thorough cost-benefit analysis.
E. Arbitrary PMTA Process
The PMTA process is arbitrary in that the FDA ignores
the enormity of costs to vaping companies, threatening to
destroy the livelihood of those invested in the industry and
completely eliminating a safer alternative to smoking cigarettes.
Though many argue e-cigarettes are dangerous in nature, the
fact that the health risks are much less detrimental and deadly
compared to traditional cigarettes provides a mitigating
alternative. Additionally, given the lack of scientific research
that conclusively categorizes e-cigarettes as an equal danger as
traditional cigarettes, the FDA has no place burdening the
public and industry stakeholders with regulations. The FDA
150 Nicopure Labs Complaint, supra note 16, at 11.
151 Sullum, supra note 144. Additionally, “[i]t is in the interest of profit-seeking
companies to constantly look for changes that make their products more appealing to
consumers, which in this case means encouraging smokers to make a switch that could
save their lives. The FDA’s response to such beneficial innovation: Cut it out.” Id.
152 Siegel, supra note 142.
153 FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of
Tobacco-related Disease, Death, supra note 82.
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notes that one PMTA “will take more than 5,000 hours to
complete and will cost a minimum of $330,000 per product.”154
Nicopure’s CEO Jeff Stamler says his company anticipates “each
e-liquid PMTA [to cost] at least $5 million, and each vaporizer
(or vaporizer component) PMTA [to cost] at least $3 million.”155
This is significantly higher than the FDA’s conservative
estimates.156 While some of the largest companies will be able to
shoulder this large financial investment in premarket approval, “it
is highly likely that the vast majority of small and independent
manufacturers will not, and so, will be put out of business.”157
This burdensome requirement alone threatens to destroy
small businesses and “hand the e-cigarette market over to a
small number of large companies, including the tobacco
companies.”158 Even if these large companies have more
resources to comply with regulations, it is not fair to wipe small
business owners out of a booming industry just because they do
not have the money to comply with exorbitantly high
administrative fees. These large companies will have amonopoly
over the industry, affecting stakeholders and the wider economy.
Were the fees justified and backed by scientific evidence,
however, the result may be different. While the FDA contends it
has done an appropriate cost-benefit analysis, the FDA
nevertheless expects that it will be difficult for manufacturers of
ENDS hardware/apparatus components “to make the showing
necessary to meet the statutory standard, given the great extent of
possible variations in combinations of hardware components, if all
are considered and sold separately.”159 Because it is financially
impossible for small manufacturers to collect the resources
necessary to file a PMTA within the allotted time frame, and
therein prove that their product is beneficial to public health and
safer than traditional cigarettes, these companies will likely go out
of business in any effort to comply with the Deeming Rule.
Nicopure likened the PMTA process to the new drug
application (NDA) process promulgated by the FDA. American
Bioscience, a pharmaceutical research company that developed a
process to safely and effectively deliver Taxol, a chemotherapy
drug, brought suit against the FDA claiming the agency’s drug
154 Michael B. Siegel, The FDA’s Vaporous Thinking About E-Cigs, WALL ST. J.
(May 5, 2016, 6:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fdas-vaporous-thinking-about-
e-cigs-1462487690 [https://perma.cc/9DEK-CY3M].
155 Sullum, supra note 144.
156 Russel, supra note 149.
157 Id.
158 Siegel, supra note 154.
159 Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28975, 28992.
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approval process was arbitrary and capricious.160 The court
described the NDA approval process as “expensive and time-
consuming, requiring data from tests showing the drug’s safety and
effectiveness.”161 American Bioscience sought to enjoin the FDA
from approving a competitor’s abbreviated NDA for a generic form
of Taxol, which was already patented.162 The court held that the
FDA’s process as well as its intervention in the marketing of
generic versions of Taxol was arbitrary and capricious.163
Similarly, the FDA’s failure to give significant weight to
the large number of predicted hours164 companies will be spending
each year on PMTA’s—leading to the waste of millions of dollars
of industry money, effective destruction of small companies in the
industry, and halt to innovation that could provide future health
benefits—is in violation of the APA. A cost-benefit analysis may
indicate a much heavier cost for small businesses with regard to
time and money required to get their products approved for the
marketplace, relative to a much smaller overall health benefit for
the population. Conceding a lack of conclusive statistical
evidence, the FDA has not provided an adequate basis for its
analysis and conclusion that the Deeming Rule should apply to
ENDS products, a clear requirement under the APA before
passing broad-reaching regulations.
Lastly, the grandfather date set forth in the Deeming
Rule is arbitrary and will cause an undue burden to vaping
companies across the country. The FDA has not demonstrated
the purpose of imposing the PMTA pathway on manufacturers
that brought products to market after the specific date of
February 15, 2007. This date set by the FDA is arbitrary, as “the
e-vapor industry was relatively nonexistent in 2007.”165
Because the date is wholly arbitrary and not reflective of
the e-cigarette industry, policymakers are fighting for a date
change. In early 2017, the House introduced the Agricultural
Appropriation Bill,166 which proposed to move the grandfather
date from February 15, 2007, to the date the Deeming Rule went
into effect, August 8, 2016.167 This proposition would exempt
160 Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
161 Id. at 1079.
162 Id. at 1084.
163 Id. at 1086.
164 See supra Section II.B.
165 Melissa Vonder Haar, Grandfather Date Takes Center Stage in ‘Deeming’ Regs,
CSP DAILYNEWS (May 6, 2016), http://www.cspdailynews.com/category-news/tobacco/articles/
grandfather-date-takes-center-stage-deeming-regs [https://perma.cc/C4UL-XWZY].
166 To Amend the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to Provide for a Certain
Effective Date with Respect to Deemed Tobacco Products, and for Other Purposes: Hearing
on H.R. 2058, 114th Cong. (2015–2016).
167 Id.
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almost all e-cigarette manufacturers and component
manufacturers from participating in the burdensome PMTA
process, and allow them to utilize the SE pathway instead.168
Mitch Zeller of the FDA, however, argued that this date change
would have negative health effects, stating that “unreviewed
products will be able to serve as predicates for new products
coming down the road.”169 Despite Zeller’s concerns, the FDA’s
current system is flawed, forcing almost every ENDS
manufacturer into the PMTA process, a process that is tedious,
expensive, and will delay sales.
Without ample consideration of alternatives,170 the FDA
is threatening to wipe out an entire industry based on its
arbitrary new regulation. It is quite easy for agencies and
administrators to place a ban on many activities,171 but “an
artificial narrowing of the scope of the regulatory problem is
itself arbitrary and capricious and is ground for reversal.”172
Without considering the large costs to the industry and public
health, overstating unknown benefits, and considering
unintended consequences of the regulation—like a halt to
innovation and the creation of a black market of ENDS products
with “dubious manufacturing standards and unknowable
toxicity”173—the FDA has not adequately shown an appropriate
purpose for the legislation under the APA. While the ENDS
market may require some regulation, the FDA’s Deeming Rule,
which treats ENDS products and components—some of which do
not even include tobacco-like traditional combustible cigarettes,
168 Id. This proposed bill provides that
A person introducing a tobacco product that is substantially similar to a
marketed product less than [twenty-one] months after that type of product is
deemed a tobacco product must submit a report to the FDA on the similar
product not later than [twenty-one] months after that type of product is
deemed a tobacco product.
H.R. 2058 (114th): FDA Deeming Authority Clarification Act of 2015, GOVTRACK (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2058/summary [https://perma.cc/NMJ6-498Z].
169 Haar, supra note 165.
170 MotorVehicleMfrs.Ass’n v. StateFarmMut.Auto. Ins.Co., 463U.S. 29, 46 (1983).
171 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977).
172 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
173 Russell, supra note 149 (“The FDA has indicated that the goal of the new
regulations is to protect Americans from tobacco-related disease and death. Yet by
rationalizing current users’ decisions to circumvent the rule by turning to black market e-
cigarettes, or going back to smoking tobacco, the regulations risk creating harm where little,
if any, currently exists for consumers. By beginning to buy e-cigarettes ‘off the books’ from
black market traders, consumers will become effectively invisible to legitimate vendors and
to health and regulatory authorities that wish tomonitor use of e-cigarettes in the population.
They will be entirely visible, however, to black market traders who will inevitably begin to
offer these consumers more than just illegal e-cigarettes.”).
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which have been proven to cause death—is wholly arbitrary and
should be overturned under the APA.
IV. STEPPINGOUT
The best way to minimize the negative effects of the
Deeming Rule is for the FDA to step out of the regulation sphere
with regard to e-cigarettes until the agency completes a true
cost-benefit analysis. Because there is unsettled science, a lack
of conclusive health research, and a need for additional studies,
the FDA should not yet monitor the industry by imposing
burdensome regulations that treat e-cigarettes like traditional
tobacco cigarettes. Until then, consumers should assume the
potential risk of smoking an e-cigarette, as intense regulation
before any conclusive determination does not help society. But
this result is unlikely: the FDA has convinced policymakers and
politicians that the e-cigarette marketplace is in dire need of
strict regulation to protect the health and safety of American
citizens. Thus, at the very least, it is imperative for the FDA to
alter the current Deeming Rule to ensure innovation and keep
companies from going out of business.
While it is important to regulate the e-cigarette market
due to its potential health risks, the FDA has exceeded its
authority in subjecting e-cigarettes to the same regulatory
scheme as traditional cigarettes without investigating the
health effects more closely. Instead of placing the massive
obstacle of PMTA fees in the way of small businesses without
conclusive research to support the regulation, the FDA should
try to make e-cigarettes safer by incentivizing innovation. The
FDA should fund additional research of its own to be carried out
by other government agencies.
Restricting the sale and marketing of ENDS products to
youth is understandable to prevent young people from choosing to
participate in an activity with unknown health consequences.
Scientists and policymakers, however, still do not yet know enough
about the health risks to justify the imposition of legislation that
threatens to knock small vaping businesses out of themarketplace.
As The Hill contributor Christopher Russell suggests, to create an
incentive for companies to participate in research, the FDA should
require manufacturers “to conduct research on the products they
wish to market, and that the quality of this research should be
assessed to determine whether the introduction of a product into
the market is likely to cause more harm than benefit to the
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public’[s] health.”174 Companies submitting any new products after
the grandfather date should be required to conduct generalized
research. This would require companies to absorb the cost of
research instead of the government, and provide a safety blanket
for consumers wondering about potential health risks. The
pathway for market approval should also apply to general
categories rather than specific, individual products, in order to
minimize costs. For example, each individual flavor of e-cigarette
liquid should not require its own extensive research; instead, the
base ingredients and recipes for flavor combinations should be
submitted to the FDA for market approval based on a cost-benefit
analysis. This would both save companies time and money, as well
as FDA resources.
While some electronic cigarettes contain nicotine, non-
tobacco products, such as component parts, should not be heavily
regulated, as they do not pose a health risk sold alone. In this
way, electronic cigarettes should be treated as consumer
products, not as tobacco products. The FDA should set “uniform
safety standards for these products—standards that address
battery safety, overcharge protection, temperature control,
safety of flavorings, and basic quality control and manufacturing
safety.”175 These uniform standards should apply to all products
on the market regardless of the grandfather date.
The current effects of the Deeming Rule will cause
small vaping companies to go out of business, leaving
consumers to a black market of electronic cigarettes, or
alternatively forcing them back into the traditional cigarette
marketplace. To reduce consumption of traditional cigarettes,
the most scientifically harmful product on the market, it’s
important not to “protect cigarettes from competition from a
much safer alternative.”176
The grandfather date of the FDA’s regulations should also
be changed. Because this date is so crucial as to whether the PMTA
process’ burdensome requirements will impact small
manufacturers and threaten to put them out of business, the
Cole/Bishop Amendment or an alternative date change is
necessary. According to Michael Siegel, a professor of Community
Health Sciences at the Boston University School of Public Health,
“[t]he only way out of this disaster would be for Congress to enact
legislation that prevents the FDA from requiring PMTAs for
vaping products and forces the FDA instead to develop actual
174 Id.
175 Siegel, supra note 142.
176 Id.
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safety standards for these products.”177 Siegel asserts that “the
Cole/Bishop Amendment is a step in the right direction,” but is still
problematic because any products under review after the
grandfather date would be subject to the PMTA process.178 Under
this amendment, PMTAs would still be required for new products,
which would in turn “stifle” innovation.179 The grandfather date
should be moved to the proposed grandfather date according to the
Cole/Bishop Amendment: August 8, 2016. Additionally, imposing a
strict two-year requirement on manufacturers to comply with the
new regulation is a large burden as well: it requires significant
costs for premarket approval within a short time frame where
funding could pose a threat to the continuation of business efforts.
This two-year frame is wholly arbitrary, especially in light of a lack
of conclusive scientific evidence as to whether ENDS products
actually pose significant harm. The FDA should consider
expanding this time frame to better accommodate the financial
needs of manufacturers.
In order to weaken the PMTA requirements to better
reflect the health benefits of e-cigarettes as well as the FDA’s
need to stay within the confines of the APA, it is important to
limit regulation on components and parts, and require scientific
research to be done on e-cigarette parts that contain chemicals
and nicotine outright. It makes more sense to regulate
potentially harmful substances than it does component parts
that do not contain anything harmful.
CONCLUSION
“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may
change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But
an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis . . . .”180 E-cigarettes provide a reduced-risk alternative
for cigarette-smokers that should not be regulated in the same
manner as traditional tobacco cigarettes. The FDA reached
beyond its scope of authority in passing the Deeming Rule,
including a broad variety of what it defines as “tobacco products”
to be heavily regulated, amounting to a burden threatening to
send local shops out of business. This unauthorized, broad
extension of authority runs contrary to the APA and must be
177 Haar, supra note 165.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (omission in original)).
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vacated or amended to reflect the health benefits of e-cigarettes
relative to traditional cigarettes.
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